This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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ABUJA PASS TO YATES, ELMORE; DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015 TAGS: <u>PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU</u>

SUBJECT: CHADIAN MEDIATION TEAM VIEWS ON ABUJA TALKS

REF: A. WALL-SNYDER TELEPHONE CALL OF MAY 30 1B. 2005

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

- 11. (C) Summary: Chad's non-attendance for the opening days of the peace talks in Abuja stems from the mediation team's misgivings over the preparedness of the rebel movement delegations to negotiate and suspicions of Libyan maneuvering to close a deal outside the Abuja process. Ambassador Wall and P/E officer met with General Mahamat Ali Abdullah on June 13 and 14 to urge Chad's participation in the current round of talks. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of all the players working within the Abuja peace process. Ali and Deby's Special Advisor for International Relations Ahmad Allam-mi will likely arrive in Abuja on June 15. In other news, the SLM's field commanders are planning a meeting on June 25 in Darfur to discuss a number of issues, including leadership and command and control. End Summary.
- 12. (C) On June 13, P/E officer met with General Mahamat Ali Abdullah, the Chairman of the Joint Commission on the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire and the leader of Chad's Mediation Team, to discuss Chad's non-participation in the current round of talks in Abuja. Ali had spent the weekend making funeral arrangements for a relative and said that he would likely travel to Abuja on June 15. Ali expressed his concern about the lack of U.S. participation in the verification commission effort. He said that this led European partners to balk at participating. P/E officer explained our understanding (ref) that at the time of the mission, the U.S. lacked qualified personnel to join the team and preferred to wait until an assessment team arrives this summer to identify a U.S. representative.

CHADIAN VIEWS ON PROGRESS

- 13. (C) Chad believes that the rebel movements internal problems will scuttle any document signed at this time, according to Ali. He is particularly concerned that the bulk of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) could disavow Khalil Ibrahim's faction. Ali believes that Khalil is now cooperating with the Government of Sudan because he lacks a presence on the ground. He suspects that Khalil's faction fears it has lost its legitimacy and decided to cut a deal in exchange for representation in the government. The Sudan Liberation Movement's (SLM) problems are more important, in Chad's view. SLM must be pushed to overcome its internal divisions, according to Ali, because it is clearly more numerous on the ground than JEM. He noted that there are other players in the SLM now, some of whom do not support either Abdelwahid or Mini.
- 14. (C) Ali outlined Chad's perspective on a reasonable

timeline for the peace process. First, the SLM holds its conference to sort out its leadership problems and names a negotiating team. The JEM also must hold a reconciliation meeting to deal with its division between Khalil and Mohammed Saleh. Second, the verification of positions on the ground is the logical next step. This will also confirm that the actual leaders of the movements are also represented on the ground. Third, the plan for the separation of forces is designed and the cease-fire begins to take effect. Fourth, the international community provides the African Union enough logistical assistance to prevent the rebel movements from coming under attack in their zones. Fifth, there is a need to begin laying the groundwork for inter-communal reconciliation. The international community could help by facilitating contact between the rebel movements, local communities and traditional leaders, and government authorities on the ground. These steps will help consolidate the cease-fire and create the necessary conditions for durable negotiations.

DOUBTS ABOUT LIBYAN AND ERITREAN AGENDAS

- 15. (C) Ali stated that Libya wants the parties to sign a
- declaration of principles so that it can push them to sign a peace agreement at the African Union summit in Tripoli. Libya's agenda is it to take the negotiations out of the hands of the African Union. The Libyans have given the rebel movements access to aircraft, hotels, and money. Libya also facilitated Dr. Khalil Ibrahim's "deal" with the Government of Sudan, according to Ali
- 16. (C) Ali confirmed the rumors of a confrontation between the Presidents of Chad and Eritrea in Tripoli. President Deby apparently had a heated debate with Eritrean President Isais in which Eritrea accused Chad of not being a neutral mediator and Deby accused Eritrea of funding and re-arming JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim. Deby and the Chadian mediators apparently believe that Eritrea is giving weapons to Khalil to rebuild his presence on the ground in Darfur to legitimize him as JEM's representative in negotiations.

FAST, DURABLE PEACE

- 17. (C) On June 14, Ambassador Wall met with Ali to urge Chad's participation in Abuja. Ali stated that both Chad and the United States are paying a lot for the crisis in Darfur in humanitarian and security assistance. He described his visits to several internally-displaced persons camps in Sudan and said that the IDP's are clearly suffering worse than the refugees in Chad. He urged the United States to keep pressure on the Government of Sudan to seek a peaceful resolution. He also noted that need for inter-communal reconciliation.
- 18. (C) He then outlined Chad's concerns about the rebel movement's deep internal problems, particularly Libyan manipulation of Khalil, Mini Minawi, and Abdelwahid. The Libyans and others want a fast peace, but the path they are on may produce an agreement but not a lasting peace. He said that Chad wants a fast, but durable peace. He also reiterated Chad's problems with the African Union's mediation efforts and its unfamiliarity with the rebel movements. The AU and others work only with the heads of the movements, but not the entire body, according to Ali. This has contributed to a lack of understanding of the profound nature of the movements' divisions. Nonetheless, Ali said Chad hopes that Salim Salim's involvement gives the process direction.
- 19. (C) Ambassador Wall emphasized that the African Union-led talks is the only credible venue for mitigating the competing interests of all of the players. Chad need to remain committed to the AU process. Chad can express its opinion on the situation at the negotiations and remain part of the equation. However, Chad's arguments cannot be heard from N'Djamena. Ali agreed and said that he will likely travel to Abuja on June 15.
- 110. (C) Ifeanyi Nwosu, Political Counselor, Nigerian Embassy in N'Djamena, told P/E officer on June 13, that President Olusegun Obasanjo has asked Deby to come to Abuja for this round of talks. Nwosu stated that Nigeria sees Chad as the country in the region bearing the brunt of the Darfur crisis. Therefore, Obasanjo wants Chad to be represented. Nigeria also is concerned about Libyan meddling and desire to move the negotiations to Tripoli.

SLM FIELD COMMANDERS TO MEET JUNE 25

current round of talks is the organization by SLM field commanders of a meeting among themselves in Darfur beginning on June 25. According to a non-governmental organization, the SLM field commanders act relatively independently of either Mini or Abdelwahid. They are capable actors who have independent means of securing resources. In interviews with 23 of SLM's commanders (out of 50 or 60), the NGO stated that the field commanders are tired of both Mini and Abdelwahid. Mini has very little support on the ground, despite his arguments to the contrary, according to the commanders in North and West Darfur. The field commanders do not expect either Abdelwahid or Mini to show up. The meeting will

discuss better internal communication, cease-fire violations, and accountability mechanisms.

COMMENT

- 112. (C) Chad's representatives are not expecting much in Abuja. They argue for pushing harder to lay the groundwork with the SLM, JEM, and their forces in the field before attempting negotiations on a political settlement. Having delayed their arrival in Abuja, Chad appears now to believe that it has made its point. We expect Ali and Allam-mi to depart N'Djamena early morning on June 15.
- $\P13$. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL

NNNN